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What is the cost of complying with federal regulations for U.S. businesses?  Figure 1 
shows that in 2004, U.S. federal government regulation cost businesses in the United 
States an estimated $648 billion.1  This cost burden has increased about 19 percent in 
inflation-adjusted dollars relative to the $545 billion estimate for 2000. The regulation 
cost per employee reached $5,633 per year in 2004. A less precise tally of trends in 
regulatory burdens is provided by regulatory agencies’ budgets and numbers of 
employees. Spending by federal regulatory agencies on regulatory activity reached $37 
billion in fiscal year 2004. This cost has grown 36 percent in inflation-adjusted dollars 
relative to $27 billion in 2000. Total staffing in federal regulatory agencies in fiscal year 
2004 equaled 239,624 full-time equivalent employees. This staffing level grew by 38 
percent between 2000 and 2004. In contrast, total estimated benefits ranged from $99 
                                                 
∗Acknowledgements—This report is based on research conducted by Echeverri-Carroll, Research 
Scientist and Director of Economic Development at the IC2 Institute, The University of Texas at Austin, 
and Ayala, a research associate at the IC2 Institute and a Ph.D. student at UT’s LBJ School of Public 
Affairs.  The authors wish to thank professors Robert A. Peterson, Robert H. Wilson, J. Bruce Kellison, 
James B. Steinberg, David B. Spence, Thomas O. McGarity, and Frank B. Cross for providing important 
comments and suggestions. They also appreciate the financial support of Temple-Inland and the LBJ 
Foundation.  Opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations are those of the authors and do not 
necessarily reflect the views of any of these Institutions. 
1  Sources for data in this paragraph are provided at the bottom of Figure 1. 
 1
billion to $484 billion from 1996 to 2006.2 Although federal regulations bring many 
benefits to society, every indicator shows that the cost for businesses of complying with 
these regulations is sizable and has been growing rapidly. 
 

























Total direct burden on businesses:  
$648 billion  
 
Cost per employee for the typical firm:  
$5,633  
 





Cost of “major” federal regulations:3 
$40-46 billion (1996-2006)   








Regulatory agencies’ budgets:  
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1 Source: Crain, Mark W. 2005. The impact of regulatory costs on small firms (SBA contract SBAHQ 03-M-
0522). Small Business Research Summary No. 264. Washington DC: Office of Advocacy, Small Business 
Administration. Available at: http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/rs264tot.pdf.  
2 Costs of all federal regulations to individuals, firms, and state and local governments (excludes 
regulatory agency spending). 
3 “Major” regulations are those with over $100 million annual impact.  Source: Office of Management and 
Budget. March 2007. Draft report to Congress on the costs and benefits of federal regulations. OIRA Reports 
to Congress. Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, OMB. Available at: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/2007_cb/2007_draft_cb_report.pdf.  
4 Source: Dudley, Susan E., and Melinda Warren. 2004. Regulators’ budget continues to rise: An analysis of 
the U.S. budget for fiscal years 2004 and 2005. Regulatory Report 26, Joint report: Mercatus Center, George 
Mason University (Arlington, VA) and Weidenbaum Center, Washington University (St. Louis, MO). 
 
                                                 
2 Office of Management and Budget. March 2007. Draft report to Congress on the costs and benefits of 
federal regulations. OIRA Reports to Congress. Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, OMB. 
Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/2007_cb/2007_draft_cb_report.pdf.  
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More than two decades ago, the increasing burden of federal regulation led President 
Reagan to make regulatory relief one of his four pillars of economic growth. He 
specifically used the term regulatory relief rather than regulatory reform to emphasize his 
desire to cut back regulations, not just make them more effective. In line with this idea, 
Reagan created the Competitiveness Policy Council (CPC) in 1988. The CPC advised the 
President and Congress on policies to promote U.S. competitiveness. The CPC 
recommended a federal law calling for the executive branch to attach a Competitiveness 
Impact Statement (CIS) to any new legislative proposal to Congress that might affect 
U.S. competitiveness. A CIS would require all U.S. federal government agencies to 
produce a document that describes how proposed major federal laws significantly affect 
the competitiveness of companies operating in the United States. In its first report to 
Congress, the CPC (1992: 40) specifically states: 
 
It is clear that our political institutions should take account of the implications for 
the country’s competitiveness of all new programs that they adopt. The Congress 
already reached such a judgment in 1988 when, in the Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act, it mandated the preparation of Competitive Impact 
Statements for precisely that purpose. The law has seemingly been ignored and 
such Statements, however, have played no role in the national debate on critical 
issues including the budget, tax policy, education, and health care reform. The 
requirement was mandated for a trial six-year period, of which over half has 
already elapsed. We therefore believe that the Administration should prominently 
include a Competitiveness Impact Statement with each recommendation or report 
on legislation that it submits to the Congress. 
 
The CPC ceased operation in 1997 when Congress stopped funding it, and the 
recommendation for CISs was never approved. However, the main issue addressed in the 
present report is: whether the concept of a CIS should be revisited.  In addressing this 
issue, we divide the remainder of the report as follows. Section 2, a review of the 
literature on the effect of government regulations on U.S. businesses, concludes that the 
lack of reliable data at the industry level leads to contradictory results. Section 3 explains 
that the lack of data at the industry level is the result of a U.S. regulatory analysis that has 
focused on measuring the efficiency (net cost to society) of regulation, not on its 
distributional effects among groups in society (including U.S. industries). Section 4 
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reports that although there exists a similar lack of data at the industry level in the 
European Union (EU), the EU business community has been successful in developing 
“business-friendly” regulations by conducting their own surveys on the effects of key 




2. Has the Cost of Regulation Affected U.S. Industrial 
Competitiveness? 
 
Figure 2 presents estimates of the costs to business of federal regulations by type: 
economic, workplace, environmental, and tax compliance. Economic regulations—those 
that refer to government-imposed restrictions on firms’ decisions regarding price, 
quantity, entry, and exit—cost businesses $295 billion in 2004. This category also 
includes international trade and investment regulations that impose restrictions on foreign 
imports (e.g., quotas and tariffs), increasing the cost of doing business. Social regulations 
cost businesses $250 billion in 2004.  These regulations are those that protect the public 
interest in the workplace (wages, benefits, safety, and health) and in the environment 
(e.g., water and air pollution). Finally, there is a substantial burden on U.S. businesses of 
paperwork costs associated with the time and resources required for recordkeeping, 
reporting, and compliance with laws and regulations.3  The time required to comply with 
the federal tax code accounts for a large part of this burden ($103 billion in 2004).4 
 
Understanding the effects of regulation on the competitiveness of businesses requires 
data on the costs of each type of regulation at the industry level. The level of aggregation 
(country, industry, or firm) used in the analysis plays a key role in our understanding of 
the relationship between regulation and competitiveness. In particular, the literature 
shows that macro (country-level) studies have failed to arrive at clear conclusions 
                                                 
3 The term paperwork burden or cost is used as a metaphor since electronic submissions are replacing 
paper. 
4 The cost estimates for the other regulations already account for most of the non-tax-related compliance 
and reporting paperwork burden associated with these regulations. 
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concerning the impact of environmental regulations on competitiveness, technological 
change, and industrial location (Grether and de Melo 2003). Barton et al. (2007) explain 
that firm-level case studies are also unlikely to produce conclusive evidence on either the 
negative impact or the advantages of environmental regulation. This is so because the 
response of firms to environmental regulation is critically dependent on the competitive 
characteristics of the industry in which they operate. Moreover, firm-level studies run the 
risk of being considered anecdotal instead of serious scholarly work. Sectoral industry 
studies, however, offer specific insights without overlooking firm dynamics (an element 
missing in aggregate macro studies) and facilitate looking at firms’ strategies at various 
stages in the value-added chain. In this regard, a key issue is: what kind of regulatory 
compliance costs data are available at the industry level?  
 
 
Figure 2—Regulatory costs and industrial competitiveness 
 
 Industrial Competitiveness 
Economic Regulations:             $295 
Regulatory Burden on the Business Sector,  
Billions (2004)  
Workplace Regulations:            $106 
Environmental Regulations:     $144 
Are U.S. pollution-intensive industries 
losing international market share? 
Are U.S. pollution-intensive industries 
investing (relocating/outsourcing) in 
countries with less stringent 
regulations? 
Tax Compliance:                       $103 
Total:                                        $648 Are U.S. pollution-intensive industries 





Source of estimates: Crain, Mark W. 2005. The impact of regulatory costs on small firms (SBA contract SBAHQ 03-
M-0522). Small Business Research Summary No. 264. Washington DC: Office of Advocacy, Small Business 
Administration. Available at: http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/rs264tot.pdf.  
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A complete analysis requires data on the cost of complying with economic and social 
(workplace and environmental) regulations at the industry level. Unfortunately, the only 
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data available by industry are the costs of complying with environmental regulations, and 
those data are rather old. Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures (PACE) are 
available for a large number of industries (up to six-digit NAICS)5 from the Bureau of 
the Census from 1973 to 1994 (except for 1987) and for 1999, when the survey was 
funded by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Most of the studies reviewed 
here use these outdated data. 
                                                
 
Following is a review of the literature on the relationship between federal regulation and 
the international competitiveness of U.S. businesses. The international benchmark refers 
to the success with which an industry (firm, individual plant, or country) competes 
against overseas counterparts, and it is often measured in the literature in terms of 
international trade, investment flows, or the effect on innovations.6  Indeed, as depicted 
in Figure 2, the studies reviewed focus on answering any of three questions. Two of these 
questions refer to the negative effect on trade or investment of increasing costs associated 
with more regulation:  Are U.S. pollution-intensive industries losing international market 
share?  Are they investing in countries with less stringent regulations?  The third question 
refers to the potential benefits associated with increasing regulation:  Are U.S. pollution-
intensive industries enjoying innovation advantages resulting from more stringent 
regulations?   
 
The issue of whether pollution abatement costs hinder the international competitiveness 
of U.S. firms has stimulated a heated debate in the United States (Stewart 1993). There is 
considerable disagreement over the extent to which increasing environmental costs have 
caused pollution-intensive firms in the United States to sell less in the international 
market (lose market share) or to relocate to pollution havens (outsource). There is also 
considerable disagreement over the extent to which stricter environmental regulations 
have stimulated innovations in U.S. businesses.   
 
5 The North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) classifies establishments by the type of 
activity in which they are primarily engaged.  NAICS industries are identified by a 6-digit code.    
6 A change in competitiveness in the context of the studies reviewed here is understood as a change in 
exports and imports (trade) or location decision of industries and firms (investment) affected by larger 
regulatory costs. However, international competitiveness can be also associated with broader characteristics 
that are harder to quantify such as the collection of factors, policies, and institutions that determine the level 
of industrial competitiveness.   
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The studies analyze either the costs associated with environmental regulation or their 
positive effects on innovation, but rarely both (the net effect). The conventional view 
associates regulation with negative effects for pollution-intensive industries, maintaining 
that regulations translate to increasing costs for such industries, putting them at a 
competitive disadvantage. This view argues that these industries will lose market share or 
will relocate to countries with less stringent environmental regulations. In contrast, the 
revisionist view makes a case for the positive aspects of regulations on these industries, 
especially the beneficial effects on innovation and export opportunities in the market for 
green technologies.  
 
 
The Negative Effects of Regulation on Business Costs 
After reviewing literature that focuses on the negative effects of regulation on businesses 
(the conventional view), Jaffe et al. (1995) conclude that there is “a very mixed picture” 
on the relationship between environmental regulation and competitiveness. Most of the 
studies, however, report that differences in environmental compliance costs rarely have a 
serious effect on industrial competitiveness (OECD 1991; Leonard 1988; Kalt 1988; 
GATT 1992; Blazejczak 1993). Indeed, some of these studies note that this is not 
surprising considering that spending on pollution control amounted to less than 2 percent 
of value added for 86 percent of U.S. industries in 1989 (Census 1991), meaning that 
labor costs and other variables outweigh environmental compliance expenses in 
importance.  
 
Other empirical studies show also little propensity for pollution-intensive industries to 
move to pollution havens (Low and Yeats 1992; Kalt 1988; Tobey 1990; GAO 1990). 
This is because even in industries with high pollution-control costs, companies often face 
other deterrents to relocation, including fixed capital costs and sensitivity to 
transportation expenses (Grossman and Krueger 1993). Thus, instead of relocating to 
less-developed countries (nominally, the South), companies implement strategies that 
allow them to continue producing in countries with stringent regulations. One of the best 
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illustrations of the environmental strategies that firms in industrialized countries follow 
when confronting stricter regulations is in the Barton et al. (2007) case studies of three 
pollution-intensive industries—iron and steel, leather tanning, and fertilizers—in a multi-
country setting.  
 
Barton et al. (2007) notice that there have been significant changes in the location of 
production for the aforementioned industries and, in particular, an increase in the share 
accounted for by developing countries. Indeed, they note that the share of the world iron 
and steel production located in developing countries has more than doubled since the late 
1970s. In the tanning industry, the share of global production located in the South 
increased from 26 percent for heavy leather and 35 percent for light leather in 1969-1971 
to 56 percent for both types of leather by the mid-1990s. Also, fertilizer production in 
developing countries has more than doubled its share of global production since the end 
of the 1970s.  
 
In spite of developing countries’ increased market share in these industries, Barton et al. 
(2007) observe that case studies of these three industries show no evidence of industrial 
flight from the more-developed countries (nominally, the North) to the South in order to 
take advantage of less stringent regulations in the latter. So if firms in these industries 
have not relocated, what strategies have they used to maintain their competitive position 
in the face of more stringent environmental regulations and intensified international 
competition?  One strategy has been to concentrate on the less price-sensitive segments 
of the market, usually by moving toward the production of high-quality products or those 
that incorporate more value added. As Barton et al. (2007) note, by emphasizing quality, 
these firms insulate themselves against competition from lower-cost overseas sources. A 
parallel strategy has been to outsource the most polluting stages of the production 
process. An example of this is the tendency of the tanning industry to import hides after 
the intermediate wet blue stage because that is the most pollution-intensive part of the 
production process (Barton et al. 2007).  
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Barton et al. (2007) point out that although some of these firms have made investments in 
developing countries, there is no evidence that these investments have been motivated by 
a desire to take advantage of less stringent environmental regulations in the host country. 
On the contrary, the main incentives have been a desire to participate in rapidly growing 
markets or to gain access to raw materials. Demand has played a significant part in the 
changing patterns of industry location in all three pollution-intensive industries. Indeed, 
evidence shows that the share of world consumption in the South has increased 
significantly in all three cases. Furthermore, Porter (1991) notes that these studies (on the 
negative effects of regulation on competitiveness) are biased because net compliance 
costs are overestimated by assuming away innovation benefits. He maintains that 
environmental regulations not only increase business costs but can also improve the 
innovation capacity of the affected businesses.  
 
 
The Positive Effects of Regulation on Innovations  
The revisionist view focuses on the positive effects of regulation on businesses. Porter 
(1991) first proposes this hypothesis, so it is often referred as the Porter Hypothesis. He 
believes that properly designed environmental standards can prompt innovation that may 
partially or more than fully offset the cost of complying with them. Such innovation 
offsets can not only lower the net cost of meeting environmental regulations, but can 
even lead to absolute advantages over firms in foreign countries that are not subject to 
similar regulations. By stimulating innovation, strict environmental regulations can 
actually enhance competitiveness. This view rests on the opportunity costs for companies 
of not controlling for pollution, not on mitigating pollution’s social costs. The focus is on 
the opportunities forgone, such as a new market for green products, when companies do 
not implement environmental control strategies.   
 
Porter and van der Linde (1995) explain that innovation in response to environmental 
regulation can take two forms. Innovation can address environmental impact without 
improving the affected product or the related processes. Such innovation simply reduces 
the cost of complying with pollution control regulations but does not change the relative 
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competitiveness of the firm that developed the innovation. The second form of innovation 
addresses environmental impacts while simultaneously improving the affected product 
itself or related processes. In some cases, the benefits of these innovation offsets can 
exceed the costs of compliance; this kind of innovation is central to the Porter and van 
der Linde (1995)’s claim that environmental regulation can actually increase industrial 
competitiveness.  
 
Case studies are the only vehicle currently available to provide evidence that complying 
with environmental regulation often improves product performance or quality. Porter and 
van der Linde (1995) cite companies like Raytheon and Hitachi as examples of “product 
offsets.”  To eliminate ozone-depleting chlorofluorocarbons in the soldering process in 
order to comply with the U.S. Clean Air Act, scientists at Raytheon adopted a new semi-
aqueous, terpene-based cleaning agent that could be reused in the cleaning of electronic 
circuit boards. The result was not only compliance but also higher product quality and 
lower operating costs. In a similar vein, scientists at Hitachi responded to a 1991 
Japanese recycling law by redesigning products to reduce disassembly time. In the 
process, they reduced the number of parts in a washing machine by 16 percent and the 
number of parts in a vacuum cleaner by 30 percent, showing how environmental 
regulations can induce companies to redesign products for better recyclability.  
 
Porter and van der Linde (1995) observe that “process offsets” are also important. For 
instance, Ciba-Geigy, in order to reduce its wastewater streams, switched to a different 
chemical conversion agent that did not result in the formation of solid iron sludge; the 
company also modified a process to eliminate the release of potentially toxic products 
into wastewater. These changes not only boosted yield by 40 percent but also eliminated 
waste, resulting in annual cost savings of $740,000.  
 
In the revisionist view, environmental regulations are seen not only as benign in their 
impacts on international competitiveness but as a net positive force driving innovation in 
U.S. firms, thereby making them more competitive in international markets (Porter 1991; 
Porter and van der Linde 1995). Thus, one of the most important results of product and 
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process offsets is that they can help companies gain international market share. Porter and 
van der Linde (1995) give the following example. Germany enacted recycling standards 
earlier than most other countries, giving German firms an early-mover advantage in 
developing less packaging-intensive products, which have been well received in the 
marketplace. When a company gains a competitive edge, especially because its home 
market is sophisticated and demanding in a way that compels further innovation, its 
economic gains can be lasting.  
 
The relationship between environmental regulation and innovation proposed in the Porter 
Hypothesis is difficult to investigate systematically due to inadequacies in available data 
(Esty 1994; Jaffe and Palmer 1996; Oates et al. 1993). The review by Jaffe et al. (1995) 
of the literature on technological change and the environment concludes that there is 
considerable disagreement over the extent to which innovation offsets exist in practice. 
When they do exist, there is also controversy over whether they are sufficiently large, 
relative to research and development (R&D) and management costs, to give rise to true 
win-win situations.  
 
Again, the multi-country sectoral study by Barton et al. (2007) of three pollution-
intensive industries finds that firms adopt new, less polluting process technologies 
because they seek economic efficiency, not because they are compelled by environmental 
regulation. They conclude that none of these industries provides a significant example of 
innovation offsets to suggest that environmental regulation leads to increased 
competitiveness. They discuss how two major technological changes in the steel industry 
(electric arc furnaces and continuous casting) have had significant environmental 
implications in recent years, but although these processes have reduced environmental 
damage, they were not a response to environmental regulation. The environmental 
benefits have been incidental to the economic advantages that have motivated the 
introduction of these technologies. Thus, the authors conclude, it is not surprising that 
steel companies tend to regard environmental improvements as involving additional costs 
instead of perceiving them in win-win terms.  
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Little is known about the effects of economic or social regulations on the competitiveness 
of U.S. industries because data on the cost of complying with these regulations at the 
industry level are simply not available. The only data available at the industry level are 
on the cost of complying with environmental regulations, and the data are somewhat old. 
Moreover, most empirical studies that use these data are biased because they do not 
account for the possible positive effects on innovation associated with environmental 
regulations. The available evidence on the effects of regulations on innovations (Porter 
Hypothesis) is rather anecdotal because hard data are not available. Why does the U.S. 
government not collect data that will allow a better understanding of the effect of 
regulations on the competitiveness of U.S. businesses?  As shown in the next section, the 
focus of the U.S. regulatory analysis process has been on improving how to measure the 
efficiency of regulations—the costs and benefits of new regulations for society. The 
distributional effects of new regulations—how their costs and benefits are divided among 
different groups in society—including businesses, local and state governments, and 
consumers—has not been its priority. 
 
 
3. The U.S. Regulatory Analysis Process 
 
During the Nixon administration (1969-74), new regulatory agencies in charge of social 
regulation—health, environment, and safety—were created.7  However, the emergence of 
new regulatory agencies was not accompanied by an effort to better measure the costs 
and benefits to society of the new regulations from these agencies. Indeed, Viscusi et al. 
(2005) note that when the new regulatory agencies were created, there was no executive 
branch oversight, so routine regulatory actions seldom received Congressional scrutiny. 
According to these authors, it was not until the 1980s that it became apparent that some 
oversight mechanism was needed to ensure that these regulations were in society’s best 
interest, and that the costs and benefits of major new regulations needed to be estimated.  
 
                                                 
7 The two most important agencies, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), were created in 1970.   
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The earlier analysis of the impact of regulation on society was dominated by techno-
bureaucratic thinking, meaning that regulators made little use of the tools from 
neoclassical economics. McGarity (1991: 7), who introduces the term techno-
bureaucratic thinking, describes it thusly:  
 
The solution to regulatory problems under the traditional model depends heavily 
upon professional judgment. Because the existing data rarely compel a 
particular result, a lot of techno-bureaucratic thinking is really grounded in a 
kind of intuition that is informed by technical training and experience. The 
technical experts do not analyze the problem and derive a solution so much as 
they “feel” their way through to an answer, accommodating as many affected 
interests as possible along the way to reduce the external resistance to their 
ultimate resolution of the problem…It is a matter of secondary importance that 
the benefits of the rule can somehow be shown to exceed its costs. 
 
 
The informality that permeated the regulatory system created general dissatisfaction with 
the regulatory process among those being regulated. In 1974, to introduce some 
presidential control over regulatory policy, President Ford (1974-77) issued Executive 
Order 11281, which mandated that an Inflation Impact Statement accompany all major 
proposals for legislation, rules, and regulations. Responsibility for implementing the new 
program was delegated to a new agency, the Council on Wage and Price Stability 
(CWPS) within the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The analysts at CWPS 
quickly concluded that a regulation would not be truly inflationary unless its costs to 
society exceeded the benefits it produced. Moreover, they defended the idea that the 
inflationary impact of a proposed rule could best be ascertained by quantitatively 
comparing the costs and benefits of the proposed rule to the costs and benefits of its 
alternative (McGarity 1991).  
 
During the Ford and the Carter (1977-81) administrations, regulatory analysis focused on 
improving the tools with which the effectiveness of a regulation was evaluated. McGarity 
(1991) describes this process as one of change from techno-bureaucratic thinking to 
comprehensive analytical rationality, which depends heavily on the paradigms of 
neoclassical microeconomics. In this latter model, the analyst would need to evaluate the 
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aggregate costs and benefits to society of a new regulation but not necessarily its effects 
on different groups, including businesses, within society.  
 
President Reagan (1981-89) believed that regulations and excessive paperwork placed 
businesses at a disadvantage in an increasingly competitive world marketplace. He 
supported continued deregulation and other reforms to eliminate regulatory obstacles to 
open competition. Shortly after taking office, Reagan abolished the CWPS and shifted its 
regulatory review staff to a new Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) 
within the OMB. This group was put in charge of estimating the aggregate social costs 
and benefits of new regulations. OIRA would evaluate new regulations based on two 
questions:  Are the benefits of the proposed regulation larger than its costs?  Is the 
proposed action the best one among alternatives?  A new, considerably larger group was 
also created within OIRA to analyze the fiscal impact of paperwork and other costs on 
regulated industries. According to Viscusi (1983), the asymmetry in the size of the staffs 
of these two groups suggests that the question of industry burden received the majority of 
the administration’s attention.  
 
Under President G.H.W. Bush (1989-93), regulatory oversight procedures remained 
virtually unchanged. Later, President Clinton (1993-2001) introduced Executive Order 
12866, which limited OIRA’s reviews to “significant regulations”—those with a likely 
substantial effect on the economy, the environment, or public health and safety, or those 
raising novel policy issues (Katzen et al. 2007). This executive order emphasized that 
many consequences of policies are difficult to quantify and that qualitative concerns 
should be taken into account as well. It introduced only a slight modification to Reagan’s 
order by streamlining (so that the OMB reviewed only 500 regulations per year instead of 
2,200) and by increasing the public consultation and transparency requirements (Morrall 
2001). 
   
On January 18, 2007, President G.W. Bush issued two documents. The first is Executive 
Order 13422, which amended Executive Order 12866 and requires that each federal 
agency have a regulatory policy office run by a political appointee to supervise the 
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development of rules and documents providing guidance to regulated industries. Despite 
White House comments that the executive order was not meant to rein in any one agency, 
business executives and consumer advocates believe that the administration was 
particularly concerned about rules and guidelines issued by the EPA and OSHA (Pear 
2007).  Business groups welcomed the executive order; however, consumers as well as 
labor and environmental groups surmise that it gives too much control to the White 
House (Pear 2007). The other document, OMB’s final bulletin on Agency Good Guidance 
Practices, extends OIRA review to include significant guidance documents. Federal 
agencies are increasingly using guidance documents to inform the public and to provide 
direction to their staff regarding agency policy on the interpretation or enforcement of 
their regulations. According to Hahn and Litan (2007), no one knows the real impact of 
guidance documents, but it could be substantial.   
 
The previous review shows that the U.S. regulatory program has become more 
sophisticated over time. U.S. regulatory agencies now use tools from neoclassical 
economics to measure the costs and benefits of new regulations to society. This is a step 
forward from the techno-bureaucratic thinking that dominated earlier regulatory analysis; 
however, as we discuss in the following paragraphs, the question remains of how 
successful regulatory agencies are in measuring the costs and benefits of new regulations. 
 
President Reagan issued Executive Order 12291 in 1981. It required agencies to issue 
regulations whose benefits outweighed their costs and to send them to the OMB for 
review and analysis before they could be published in the Federal Register as proposals 
or as final regulations with the effect of law. This executive order also required that major 
regulations (over $100 million annual impact) had to be accompanied by a Regulatory 
Impact Analysis (RIA).  
 
Hahn and Dudley (2007) study how well the U.S. government conducts cost-benefit 
analyses after more than 25 years of preparing RIAs. They assess a sample of 75 cost-
benefit analyses of federal environmental regulations from the EPA that spanned the 
Reagan, G.H.W. Bush, and Clinton administrations. They find that a significant 
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percentage of the analyses done by the EPA did not report some very basic economic 
information and that there was a great deal of variation in the quality of the cost-benefit 
analyses. They point out that while 100 percent of the RIAs monetized at least some 
costs, only 50 percent monetized at least some benefits. This suggests that comparisons 
of costs and benefits were not occurring in a large number of cases for which the 
necessary data were actually available.  
 
Hahn and Tetlock (2007) concludes that we do not have answers to basic questions like 
whether cost-benefit analyses tend to overstate costs or whether they tend to overstate 
benefits. For instance, in the case of health-related regulations, estimating benefits can 
involve a long chain of reasoning that links basic science to health effects to the 
monetization of those effects. Costs are also difficult to estimate because it is hard to 
gauge how firms will respond and how technology will evolve. Furthermore, it can be 
quite difficult to estimate how a regulatory policy will affect different segments of the 
population. As highlighted by the authors, such distributional concerns, while important, 
have not been a primary focus of cost-benefit analyses. Similar initiatives exist in the EU 
and in many countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), but as noticed by Hahn and Tetlock (2007), the U.S. is probably the world’s 
leader in implementing some form of government-sponsored cost-benefit analysis to 
inform significant regulatory decisions.  
 
Impact Assessment (IA) is the European counterpart of the U.S. RIA. IA is required for 
all major European Commission (EC) initiatives and contains an evaluation of the social, 
economic, and environmental impacts of various policy options associated with a 
proposal. The EC encourages estimates to be expressed in qualitative, quantitative, and, 
where appropriate, monetary terms (Commission of the European Communities 2004). 
Renda (2006) analyzes the first 70 IAs carried out by the EC from 2003 to July 2005 
using a scorecard similar to that used by Hahn and Dudley (2007). Renda finds that the 
IAs seldom estimated costs, almost never quantified costs to businesses, did not specify 
benefits, and virtually never compared costs and benefits. In addition, alternatives were 
seldom compared and discount rates were almost never specified. Given the difficulty of 
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estimating a new regulation’s costs and benefits by using neoclassical microeconomic 
methods, both the EC and the EU’s business community have opted for a different 
methodology—business surveys—to estimate how new regulations will affect the 
competitiveness of European businesses.  
 
The review of the U.S. regulatory analysis conducted in this section shows that the 
emphasis has been on making this process more efficient by depending heavily on the 
paradigms of neoclassical microeconomics to measure the costs and benefits of 
regulations.  There is evidence that the government is still very inefficient in performing 
this task, and more importantly, that it has put little effort in measuring the distributional 
effects of federal regulations among different groups in the society.  Starting with 
President Reagan's administration, there has been some emphasis on measuring the 
impact of regulations on small businesses, but for the most part, data are still lacking that 
would allow evaluating the impact of regulation on the competitiveness of U.S. industries 
separately from its effects on households and other groups.  The difficulty of using cost-
benefit analysis to estimate the distributional effects of regulation has led the European 
Union and many European countries to adopt a complementary methodology: business 
surveys.  In the following section, some of the business surveys developed in the 
European Union and in Sweden in particular, which is perhaps the EU's most active 
country in the implementation of business-friendly regulations, are addressed. 
 
 
4. Learning from the European Experience 
 
The theme that the U.S. economy and its businesses are losing competitive advantage is 
one usually discussed by industrial organizations. In its Global Competitiveness Report 
2007-2008, the World Economic Forum (2007) states that the United States still tops the 
overall ranking in competitiveness. However, the American Electronics Association’s 
2007 report We Are Still Losing the Competitive Advantage contends that although the 
United States still leads the world in science, technology, and innovation, it is at risk of 
squandering this preeminence as countries across the globe become more competitive. In 
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a lecture given at the Heritage Foundation, Bord (1992) questions how American 
corporations can be competitive in the emerging global economy while struggling under 
the most elaborate and oppressive regulatory regime of any developed market economy 
in the world. In her view, “government regulation operates as an ‘invisible foot’ planted 
firmly on the back of American business and impeding its global competitiveness.”   
 
Krugman (1994) argues that defining national competitiveness is problematic because, 
unlike corporations, countries do not go out of business. However, there is no doubt that 
industries compete across borders. In this regard, there is real concern that the expansion 
of the U.S. regulatory system may affect the competitiveness of U.S. industries. This 
concern is primarily focused on the effect of increasing environmental compliance costs. 
Every year, U.S. firms devote significant resources to developing ways to deal with 
environmental problems, introducing new methods of reducing or treating air or water 
emissions, recycling or reusing waste, finding cleaner energy sources, and seeking other 
methods of environmental protection (Brunnermeier and Cohen 2003).  
 
Overall, there is little evidence to support the hypothesis that environmental regulations 
have had a large net adverse effect on competitiveness. Unfortunately, these conclusions 
are based on old data and on studies that have analyzed only the effects of regulations on 
costs or benefits, but not both. The lack of data is the bottleneck that prevents 
understanding the relationship between regulation and competitiveness. What can the 
U.S. business community do?  It needs to take a proactive role following the lead of other 
countries. Canada adopted its Business Impact Test8 (not discussed here) because 
regulators did not do a good job in this area. Similarly, member countries of the EU have 
been active in developing “business-friendly” regulations. 
 
In the past few years, regulatory simplification has been an increasingly important 
economic issue in the EU. About 20 member countries as well as the EU’s own 
institutions are working to reduce companies’ administrative costs due to regulation. This 
                                                 
8 This test was developed by Industry Canada, Treasury Board of Canada, and the Canadian Manufacturers 
and Exporters Association. 
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objective is part of a general understanding among decision makers that the regulatory 
burden on businesses needs to decrease and that business-friendly regulation is a priority 
in marketing the EU countries as the best place to do business. Among the EU countries, 
the business community in Sweden has undertaken one of the most important initiatives 
on studying the relationship between regulation and competitiveness. Figure 3 
summarizes some of the most important initiatives in Sweden and the EU. 
 
The Board of Swedish Industry and Commerce for Better Regulation (NNR) was founded 
in 1982 as an independent, non-partisan organization funded entirely by its members.9  
The membership consists of the 14 largest Swedish business organizations and trade 
associations comprising a combined membership of some 300,000 companies. The NNR 
represents a third of all active companies in Sweden. Its principal focus is regulatory 
simplification and a more business-friendly environment, not only in Sweden but also in 
the EU. One of its principal tasks is to coordinate the business sector’s scrutiny of IAs 
and to negotiate with regulatory agencies during the evaluation of the costs and benefits 
of a new regulation.  
 
The NNR chairs the Better Regulation Working Group of the Confederation of European 
Business (BUSINESSEUROPE).10  The Group includes representatives from all major 
business organizations in the EU member countries. It encourages a Europe-wide 
competitive industrial policy and acts as a spokesperson for European institutions. The 
recommendations of the Group are communicated to EU policy makers to make sure that 
business interests are taken into account as legislation is formulated. 
 
Perhaps the NNR’s biggest success is a government ordinance, approved on January 1, 
2008, requiring Swedish regulatory agencies to carry out IAs when proposing new 
national regulations or amending existing ones. The ordinance states that policy makers 
should consult with businesses and take into consideration all effects on businesses, not 
just monetary costs. The NNR was also successful in conveying to the Swedish 
                                                 
9 Most of the information presented here comes from the NNR website:  http:www.nnr.se/inenglish.html. 
10 http://www.businesseurope.eu 
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government the need for a national Impact Assessment Board that will review the quality 
of all IAs. The idea of creating this board has been strongly supported in The NNR 
Regulation Indicator since the NNR started publishing it annually in 2002.  
 
Figure 3—Business regulation: main European initiatives 
 
  
2 EUROPEAN UNION (EU) 
 
“The Competitiveness Driver”— 
Soft cost-benefit analysis in RIAs 
 
Objective 
To develop business-friendly regulation to make the EU the best place to do business 
 
European Business Test Panel 
 
• Started in 2003 
• Online survey of 3,900 companies  
• 5-8 consultations per year—awareness of consultation fatigue 
SWEDEN 1
 
New Law (January 2008)—
Policymakers should consider all 




To work for fewer and simpler business regulations and to minimize the extent to which 
companies are required to report information 
 
The Board of Swedish Industry and Commerce for Better Regulation (NNR) 
 
• Established in 1982 
• 300,000 member companies 
• Report on Regulatory Indicators, 2007  
 
o Since 2001 
o Evaluates 150 proposals for new or amended regulations  
o Summarizes 500 simplification proposals submitted by businesses 
 
• NNR Newsletter 





In November 2007, NNR published its sixth annual ‘Regulation Indicator’ report.  The 
report analyzes the quality of new and amended regulations and the progress of the 
government's better regulation program.  The 2007 evaluation covers 150 proposals for 
new or amended regulations put forward by government agencies and departments.  The 
report shows that in over 60 percent of the cases, proposed new or amended regulations 
would lead to an increase in administrative costs for businesses.  NNR proposes 12 
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measures that the government should implement to reduce businesses' administrative 
costs of complying with regulation by 25 percent by 2010.  
 
In addition to the annual report, the NNR recently published a study titled The Total Cost 
of Regulations to Businesses in Sweden (2007).  This study summarizes findings from a 
project to estimate the total cost to businesses of complying with selected new 
regulations.  The costs were divided into three categories: administrative, financial, and 
material or policy costs.  In-depth interviews were conducted with companies from 
different sectors and of different sizes to estimate their total annual compliance costs that 
stem from national and EU regulations. 
 
Sweden is not the only country that has been very active in developing business-friendly 
regulations; the European Community as a whole has also moved in the same direction. 
In January 2008, the EC established a high-level group of independent stakeholders. The 
group has a three-year mandate to advise the EC through the implementation of its Action 
Plan on Reducing Burdens Imposed by Legislation in the EU. The group has 15 members 
from industry, small and medium enterprises (SMEs), and environmental and consumer 
groups. Although the main focus of the group has been on reducing administrative 
burdens by 25 percent, the NNR Newsletter (January 2008: 3) suggests that “they must 
look beyond administrative costs. Considerations should be given to the total costs to 
businesses of complying with regulation, including policy and enforcement costs.” 
 
One of the most important business initiatives developed by the EC is the European 
Business Test Panel (EBTP) that started in 2003.11  This online survey asks 3,900 
companies about the impact of major regulations. The EBTP is a representative sample of 
firms across sectors and countries that comprise the European economy. The EC 
anticipates that the EBTP could be incorporated into IAs in the future. By joining the 
EBTP, companies have an opportunity to remark on upcoming EU legislation. They are 
invited to comment on upcoming policy proposals between six and eight times per year 
                                                 
11 http://ec.europa.eu/yourvoice/ebtp 
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through a short online questionnaire. The EC has a “10 questions in 10 minutes” policy 
and intends to provide helpful feedback on the results obtained. 
 
5. Conclusions  
 
By law, the U.S. Office of Management and Budget presents annual estimates of the 
costs and benefits of major regulations by agency, program, and rule. It must also 
estimate the impact of regulation on small businesses, but in this case, instead of 
conducting its own estimates, OMB reports data from three studies sponsored by the 
SBA’s Office of Advocacy. These studies estimate total regulatory costs including the 
cost for small businesses (Crain 2005; Crain and Hopkins 2001; Hopkins 1996). There is, 
however, a vast discrepancy between the estimates of the total cost of regulation by 
OMB- and SBA-sponsored studies, mainly related to differences in the set of federal 
regulations that they analyze (major regulations reviewed by the OMB versus all 
regulations by SBA-sponsored studies). Neither OMB- nor SBA-sponsored studies 
provide detailed estimates of the costs of regulations by industrial sector (e.g., by at least 
four-digit NAICS). Rather, they only provide estimates of the cost of regulations for all 
businesses in the United States. 
 
As documented in this paper, businesses paid an estimated $648 billion to comply with 
U.S. federal government regulation costs in 2004. As also reported here, every indicator 
shows that the cost for businesses of complying with these regulations is sizable and has 
been growing rapidly. Has this cost affected the competitiveness of U.S. businesses?  
Most of the studies conclude that differences in environmental compliance costs rarely 
have a serious effect on industrial competitiveness. These empirical studies, however, do 
not account for the costs associated with other types of federal regulations. The scarcity 
of data on the cost of other kinds of federal regulations may explain the much larger 
number of studies that analyze the relationship between pollution abatement costs and 
competitiveness than those addressing the cost of complying with health and safety laws 
or economic regulations on competitiveness.  
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Other studies make a case for the positive aspects of regulation on industries (Porter 
Hypothesis). These studies hypothesize that properly designed environmental standards 
could prompt innovation that may partially or more than fully offset the cost of 
complying with them. Such innovation offsets could not only lower the net cost of 
meeting environmental regulations but could even lead to absolute advantages over firms 
in foreign countries that are not subject to similar regulations. By stimulating innovation, 
strict environmental regulation could actually enhance competitiveness. However, 
empirically testing the Porter Hypothesis is difficult because there are no data available, 
and the few relevant case studies show that environmental benefits were incidental to the 
economic advantages that motivated the introduction of new technologies.  
 
The following question remains: Why is the U.S. government not collecting data that will 
allow a better understanding of the effects of regulation on the competitiveness of U.S. 
businesses?  Since 1981, the U.S. government has required that regulatory agencies 
prepare a Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) in which federal agencies estimate the total 
costs and benefits for society of a new regulation. As reviewed here, the priority of the 
U.S. regulatory analysis program has been on improving how to measure the efficiency of 
a regulation—the costs and benefits of a new regulation for society. In contrast, the 
distributional effects of new regulations—how their costs and benefits are divided among 
different groups in society, including businesses, local and state governments, and 
consumers—have not been a priority.  
 
Recent studies that have analyzed RIAs’ success in estimating costs and benefits 
conclude that answers do not exist to basic questions such as whether cost-benefit 
analyses tend to overstate costs or overstate benefits. They note that it is also difficult to 
predict how firms will respond to new regulations or how technology may change their 
response. Moreover, attempting to estimate how a particular regulatory policy might 
differentially affect various sectors of society is not straightforward. And, although these 
distributional concerns are vital, they have not been at the center of cost-benefit analyses.  
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An impact assessment (IA) is the European counterpart of a U.S. RIA. Studies that 
evaluate IAs conclude that they seldom estimate costs, almost never quantify costs to 
businesses, do not specify benefits, and virtually never compare costs and benefits. In 
addition, alternatives are seldom compared, and discount rates are almost never specified. 
Given the lack of consistency and reliable estimates of the costs and benefits of a new 
regulation, the business community in Europe has opted for a proactive approach, 
conducting its own studies and collecting its own data on the effects of new regulations. 
 
Important business initiatives in Europe include: 
• the EU's European Business Test Panel, an online survey that asks companies 
about the impact of major regulations  
• the UK's Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, which 
seeks to achieve a better EU regulatory environment (not discussed in this report)  
• Sweden's Board of Industry and Commerce for Better Regulation (NNR), which 
publishes an annual report on the effect of new regulations on businesses (based 
on a survey of member companies) and negotiates with regulatory agencies 
during the evaluation of the costs and benefits of new regulations. 
 
The lack of consensus in the results from empirical studies in the United States hinders 
the ability to conclude either that regulation is hurting U.S. firms or that there is a need 
for a Competitiveness Impact Statement that will force federal agencies to account for the 
effects of regulation on businesses.  The justification for a CIS or a similar new approach 
would have to be based on an analysis of the effects on business of all regulatory costs 
(not just pollution abatement costs) and on a deeper understanding of the strategies that 
companies follow to offset stricter regulatory policies.  However, U.S. businesses should 
not simply wait for the federal government to build the necessary databases and studies 
that will support such initiative.  Rather, they should emulate the experience of European 
countries in conducting their own surveys and studies on the effect of major regulations 




Which organization, then, could or should conduct these surveys and conduct relevant 
studies?  Founded in 1986, the Council on Competitiveness is a group of corporate CEOs, 
university presidents, and labor leaders committed to enhancing U.S. competitiveness in 
the global economy.12  A nonpartisan, nongovernmental organization in Washington, 
D.C., the Council shapes the debate on competitiveness. However, competitiveness is a 
broad concept that involves a diversity of issues. For instance, in 2008, the Council’s 
focus has been on the need to improve the education system in the United States, to set a 
national agenda to equip Americans with the skills needed to compete globally, and to 
identify the barriers that large and small firms face in moving from desktop computers to 
high performance computing servers. Hence, it appears that examining the effect of 
federal regulation on competitiveness is not its immediate priority. Another organization, 
the AEI Reg-Markets Center (formerly the AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory 
Studies) at the Brookings Institute, funded in 2008, studies how markets, laws, and 
regulation contribute to economic well-being. It is maintained in this report that the U.S. 
needs an organization similar to Sweden’s NNR, whose only purpose is to study the 
effect of federal (national) regulations on U.S. businesses. 
 
Yet not all regulation is national in scope. Much regulation occurs at the state and local 
levels.13  The organization that conducts the proposed surveys should also consider the 
effect of state regulations on U.S. businesses. Under the Reagan and G.H.W. Bush 
administrations, there was an emphasis on transferring some of the control over 
regulatory structure and regulatory enforcement to the states. Lipton and Gardiner (2007) 
wrote in the New York Times that some big industries are actually seeking more federal 
regulation in order to compete with cheap imports and as a tactic to forestall tougher state 
regulations that were a response to the G.W. Bush administration’s hands-off policies. 
This change in tactic is motivated in part by growing competition from inexpensive 
imports, mainly from China. The article quotes the director of regulatory policy at OMB 
                                                 
12 Most of the information about the Council comes from its website: http://www.compete.org. 
13 It is noteworthy that from a historical standpoint, most regulation, such as the rate regulations for 
railroads, began at the state level.  These regulations were subsequently extended to the national level.   
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Watch, a Washington group that tracks federal regulatory actions, who said, “I have 
never before seen so many industries joining a push for regulation” (p. 1). 
 
In addition to our review of the literature, we conducted interviews with three experts on 
U.S. regulatory policy (see the Appendix for details) to test their support for a 
Competitiveness Impact Statement (CIS).  They confirmed many of the findings 
discussed here in our literature review, but also stressed the need to study whether a CIS 
will intensify the paperwork burden of federal agencies. Thus, the organization that 
conducts the survey should also take into consideration the cost for federal agencies of 
complying with this new law. 
 
In 2004, the costs of federal regulation reached $1.1 trillion for all groups in society 
(including businesses, consumers, and state governments).  More important for the 
purpose of this report, the total cost of regulation for U.S. businesses was $648 billion, 
and the cost per employee was $5,633, a 4.1 percent increase since 2000 (after adjusting 
for inflation).14  The burden of total regulatory costs was even larger for the 
manufacturing sector, which in 2004 bore a cost per firm of $548,077 and a cost per 
employee of $10,175. The link between regulatory costs and competitiveness deserves 
serious attention, especially through the building of new data sources and surveying U.S. 
businesses on the effect of major regulations. A multi-country industry database of the 
costs of regulation would permit disentangling the effects of firms’ strategies (control 
variables) from the direct effects of increasing regulation costs on their competitiveness.  
In short, until we do not have good data on the impact of regulation on U.S. industries, 






                                                 
14 Who ended up bearing the cost of regulation?  Depending on the elasticity of demand, producers may be 
able to transfer some of these regulatory costs to the consumer through higher prices.  The available data on 
the burden of regulation on the private sector do not account for these effects.  As Viscusi et al. (2005: 41) 
note, “In practice, however, the shifting of this and other costs among consumers, shareholders, workers, 
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As indicated at the beginning of this report, the motivation for the literature review on the 
relationship between federal regulation and competitiveness is to explore the need for a 
Competitiveness Impact Statement (CIS). In addition to our extensive review of the 
literature, we conducted interviews with three experts on the U.S. regulatory system (see 
their biosketches below) to explore the net benefits of a CIS. We asked them two 
questions:  Is the idea of a CIS a good one?  Can any other impact statement, and in 
particular, the Environmental Impact Statement,15 be used as a model for a CIS?  There 
was considerable consensus in their answers. 
 
McGarity argues that a new CIS would intensify the “ossification” (a term that he 
introduces to the literature in the 1970s) of federal agencies; that is, it would impose more 
paperwork on them. He points out that “a CIS will be something that will get in [the 
agencies’] way and will slow them down.”  He also notes that surprisingly little progress 
has been made in assessing regulatory costs. Cross has a similar view. He points out that 
a CIS will not only slow down federal agencies (keeping them from performing their 
main task of protecting the public), but will also contribute to the increase of the already 
high costs of preparing impact statements. Spence argues that too many rules could get in 
the way of each other, making the entire regulation process very inefficient. 
 
In assessing the validity of using the EIS as a model for a CIS, McGarity points out that 
the EIS has two objectives:  (1) to have an impact on substantive decisions by federal 
agencies and (2) to inform the public. In his view, the EIS has failed in its first objective 
but has excelled in the second one since it has been a very successful tool to inform the 
public on the possible environmental consequences of a large project. Since the main 
objective of a CIS would be to have an impact on substantive decisions by federal 
agencies, it is difficult to argue that the EIS would be a good model for a CIS. While 
Cross disagrees with the idea of a CIS, he approves of the existence of an EIS because the 
latter does not apply to regulations (as a CIS would) but to large government projects 
such as dams. Spence notes that for the federal agencies, the EIS is “just a bother … 
something that has to be done. They typically hire a consultant … so there is a cost, but it 
is rarely a deal-breaking cost. In contrast, pollution abatement costs can be very 
[significant].”  The EIS’s “lack of significance” makes it very difficult to argue that it 
might be a good model for a CIS.  
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15 According to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), whenever the federal government takes a 
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4332). 
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